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NOTES AND COMMENT
It might be well to state in this connection the objection of the dis-
senting justices to the constitutionality of the interpretation of the
court. "If the principal contractor, who has complied with the law
and requires his sub-contractor to protect his employees by insurance,
is not an employer, within the meaning of the statute, I see no con-
stitutional basis upon which liability may be imposed upon him. It is
said that by accepting the terms of the act he becomes an insurer;
the act makes no provision for third or .other party bringing themselves
within its terms. One not an employer "cannot accept the provisions
of the act." The relationship is certainly not that of insured and
insurer, for that relationship implies the voluntary agreement to assume
by contract a definite obligation."
CHARLES L. GOLDBERG
Monopoly: Fixing of Reasonable Prices; Reasonable Restraint
of Trade.
In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. et al.,1 a prosecution under
the Sherman Anti-Trust law, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier
position that a combination between producers of articles sold in
interstate commerce to fix prices is in violation of the Sherman Anti-
trust Act, regardless of whether or not the prices fixed are unreason-
able.
In their exposition of the present state of the law an interesting
analysis of the law on this point was drawn by Justice Stone. The per-
tinent, refused instruction primarily considered in this regard was as
follows :
The essence of the law is injury to the public. It is not every restraint of
competition and not every restraint of trade that works an injury to the public;
it is only an undue and unreasonable restraint of trade that has such an
effect and is deemed to be unlawful.
The charge was found to be true as an abstract proposition although
inapplicable to the present case to the point of effect of reasonable-
ness of prices fixed. The charges given, viewed as a whole, were held
to have fairly submitted to the jury the question whether a price fixing
agreement was entered into by respondents. The gist of the Court's
discussion on this point is embodied in the following at page 406-7:
It does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are reasonable
restraints and therefore permitted by the statute, merely because the prices them-
selves are reasonable.
Our view of what is reasonable restraint of commerce is controlled by the
recognized purpose of the Sherman Law itself. Whether this type of restraint
is reasonable or not must be judged in part at least in the light of its effect on
competition, for whatever difference of opinion there may be among economists as.
to the social and economic desirability of an unrestrained competitive system, it
cannot be doubted that the Sherman Law and -the judicial decisions interpreting
it are based upon the assumption that the public interest is best protected from
the evils of monopoly and price control by the maintenance of competition..
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimina-
tion of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, whether reasonably
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exercised or not, involves power to control the market and to fix arbitrary and
unreasonable prices. The reasonable price fixed today may through economic
and business changes become the unreasonable price of tommorrow. Once es-
tablished, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition
secured by the agreement for a price reasonable when fixed. Agreements which
create such potential power may well be held to be in themselves unreasonable
or unlawful restraints, without the necessity of minute inquiry whether a particu-
lar price is reasonable or unreasonable as fixed and without placing on the govern-
ment in enforcing the Sherman Law the burden of ascertaining from day to
day whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of economic
conditions. Moreover, in the absence of express legislation requiring it, we
should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and
illegal conduct in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test
as to whether prices are reasonable-a determination which can be satisfactorily
made only after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice
between rival philosophies.
Thus viewed, the Sherman Law is not only a prohibition against the infliction
of a particular type of public injury. It is a limitation of rights . . . . which
may be pushed to evil consequences and therefore restrained.
In the Standard Oil Case where, in considering the Freight Assn. Case, the
court said (221 U.S.) p. 65:
"That, as considering the contracts or agreements, their necessary effect and
the character of the parties by whom they were made, they were clearly restraints
of trade within the purview of the statute, they could not be taken out of that
category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or non-expediency
of having made the contracts or the wisdom or want of wisdom of the statute
which prohibited their being made. That is to say, the cases but decided that
the nature and character of the contracts, creating as they did a conclusive pre-
sumption which brought them within the statute, such -result was not to be dis-
regarded by the substitution of a judicial appreciation of what the law ought
to be for the plain judicial duty of enforcing thelaw as it was made."
H.W.I.
Parent and Child: Tort: Right of Infant to Recover From Parent.
"Honor thy father and thy mother."
If the fourth commandment was never announced by any of the
writers of the common law (because no case involving a child's suit
against its natural parent was ever brought before the courts of
England) it was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets
of Mount Sinai and by the recent case of Wick v. Wick,1 firmly fixed
in the jurisprudence of our commonwealth-Wisconsin. This was an
action brought against the defendant by his infant child, under the age
of fourteen years, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained
by plaintiff as a result of an automobile accident due to the negligence
of the defendant. A demurrer to the complaint was overruled, and
the appeal from the order overruling the demurrer presented the ques-
tion of whether an infant child may maintain an action in tort against
its parent.
In answering this question in the negative, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court based its decision on the dictates of the Natural Law and on
considerations of public policy. Said the court:
